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GLOBALISATION OF THE 
POWERLESS-A ZONE OF 
INSTABILITY AND THE 
DISABLED STATE 
Andrew Wells 
Much of the debate on refugee issues has been concentra~ed in either the morality or the effectiveness of the treatment meted out to 
refugees as they attempt to enter Australia and are incarcerated as illegal 
migrants by an unyielding government. This debate is very important, and 
is comprehensively discussed elsewhere in this book. The principal themes 
are how Australia treats people once they seek protection as refugees, and 
what impact specific policies will have on future asylum seekers. 
However, a number of other important issues are either treated as 
secondary or, more frequently, ignored. An issue, not widely debated, is 
what social, political and economic circumstances push people to take 
what, by any normal standards, are the extreme measures of abandoning 
their own communities and peoples for the desperate gamble that seeking 
refuge entails. Without discussing this contextual matter-the conditions 
that provoke refugees-it is easy though wistfully misleading to presuppose 
that 'orderly queuing' and 'following the correct channels' are real options 
facing those fleeing repression or social chaos. 
When we project the circumstances that generate the 'refugee problem' 
onto a wider regional canvas we can begin to see the issue from a rather 
different perspective. One important generalisation that we need to 
place at the centre of the current refugee debate-a thesis derived from 
a complex mosaic of fact, theory and conjecture-is that the Asia-Pacific 
region, and especially South-east Asia are increasingly zones of deep and 
intensifying instability. That instability is registered in two different but 
related conclusions: the Region is both a Significant source and a major 
transit space for a growing refugee movement. The short-term success 
of 'fortress Australia' in stopping the flow of refugees is undoubtedly a 
Pyrrhic victory, but one which has conveniently pushed a host of serious 
questions to one side. 
A Zone of Instability 
Over the past thirty years postcolonial Asia has witnessed revolutions, 
wars, coups, massacres, starvation, and poverty, as well as rapid economic 
growth, urbanisation and modernisation. A confusing pattern that defies 
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easy categorisation has emerged. Some who have viewed the rise of East 
Asia to global economic power have even claimed that the centre of 
gravity of the world economy has shifted east. There is of course some 
truth in this generalisation, especially if we focus on the East Asian 
developmental states-especially Japan, South Korea, Taiwan-and the 
rapid modernisation of Singapore and Hong Kong, and the significant 
transformation of Malaysia and Thailand. But even in these countries, 
since the 1997-1998 financial crisis, and in the case of Japan even earlier, 
we can no longer be so sure that the growth is self sustaining. 
When we cast our eyes further south and south-west what limited 
optimism we may have had from looldng north is quickly dissipated. 
In a giant arc stretching from Paldstan to the Philippines, Australians 
live in close proximity to a series of postcolonial states in real danger 
of disintegrating and descending into communal and ethnic conflict. 
Geographically separating the relative stability and growth of the north 
from the arch of instability in the south, lies the giant state of China. 
Here elements of the north and south coexist in an explosive mix. China 
is currently experiencing one of the most dramatic and rapid processes 
of dislocation, relocation and reorganisation of people and workers the 
world has experienced. 
Globalisation and Inequality 
Operating in this 'zone of instability' are, I think, four forces that we 
need to understand. The first and determinate force is what is frequently 
called globalisation-possibly the most over-used and misunderstood 
concept of our times. Its complexity can be understood by simultaneously 
grasping two related but seemingly contradictory processes. On the one 
hand globalisation is the intensification of economic integration of about 
twenty per cent of the world's population measured by the flow of trade, 
capital, investment, people and the repatriation of profits. This core of the 
globalised world includes parts, but by no means all of North America, the 
European Union, East Asia and Australia. Globalisation as experienced 
by the already affluent and developed world is a consequence rather than 
a cause of the growing interdependence of similar economic, legal and 
political systems. 
On the other hand globalisation is a political process largely driven 
from the core of the global political economy designed to transform the 
political, social and legal relationships that dominate the rest of the world. 
In a sense is it nothing other than the continuation of the colonial process 
itself pursued by other means. Where the process of social change has been 
largely produced by former imperial defeat and military occupation-J apan, 
Korea and Taiwan-and then consolidated and intensified by a ruthless 
modernising elite, then political transformation can extend to economic 
globalisation. Thus the apparent impact of globalisation is political and 
economic change that will ultimately make the entire world accommodating 
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to global market relations. The only significant catch in this argument is 
that very few states achieve the capacity to enter the global market place 
on advantageous or even equal terms. 
Thus the rather contradictory reality is that globalisation is felt as a 
progressive economic necessity by the many in rich countries, but as an 
alien political imposition by the majority in poor countries. Even then 
significant minorities in rich countries experience the collapse of traditional 
manufacturing industries and the collapse of segments of the labour market 
as a disaster, while minorities in poor countries embrace the benefits of 
global economic integration. The same idea can be illustrated historically: 
Aborigines were transformed by an earlier form of imperial political and 
economic process of globalisation. They were not so much drawn into the> 
world political economy, but experienced the use of political and legal 
power to transfer ownership of their land and livelihood to Anglo-European 
control and economic exploitation. This dispossession of property was 
linked to a massive and coercive transfer of resources to the proprietors of 
the British economy. Although Aboriginal life was totally transformed by 
imperial coercion and then global economic activity, they had no significant 
agency in initiating that change. 
In the contemporary regional context much of the force of globalisation 
is neither welcome, nor harnessed to local needs. The rapid felling of 
some of the remaining stands of valuable hardwoods, or the exploitation 
of mineral deposits do not in themselves produce sustainable growth. 
Within the contemporary pattern of globalisation we can observe a 
limited number of states that are beneficiaries of processes that sustain 
obscene levels of material consumption for a global minority with dramatic 
consequences in environmental despoliation and the consumption of raw 
material including oil. This is what is meant when politicians defend 'our 
way of life'. To the bulk of the world's population much of globalisation 
translates into currency instability, food price inflation, the reduction of 
public services and falling living standards with rising unemployment. A 
serious consequence of this economic instability is the process of disabling 
the post-colonial state. 
Two examples well illustrate the negative impact of this global economy 
in our region. The Philippines and Indonesia have both become major 
labour exporters. Throughout the more affluent countries of the region, 
and extending into the Middle East and beyond, a vast diaspora of the 
new indentured construction, manufacturing and domestic workers have 
looked for work. This has resulted in millions of migrant workers deserting 
their villages and towns, frequently for short periods but often for decades, 
in order to meet basic needs and repatriate income to support families 
at home. While much of the labour is organised and regulated, there are 
significant groups of illegal workers vulnerable to changing labour demands. 
Supporting the legal and illegal trade in workers is a string of shabby 
labour recruiters, moneylenders, labour overseers, shippers and agencies. 
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So important has this business of labour export and financial remittances 
become, that the Philippines-to take the most extreme example-relies 
upon this income as its biggest single export industry. 
In the island of Kalimantan-or Borneo as it was once known-
traditional hunter-gatherer Dyak people are being systematically displaced 
as logging and mining interests move further and further in, searching 
for and exploiting natural resources. The Indonesian state and the joint-
venture companies associated with the regime in Jakarta have no hesitation 
in using force and the law to facilitate this spread of a modern export 
economy. Ethnic minorities in the outer islands of Indonesia are a frequent 
source ,of friction to the Javanese establishment. 
Thus in the zone of instability people are displaced and forced to 
move to find security and employment. This produces millions of people 
completely dependent of the vagaries of the world market. When Saudi 
Arabian living standards continue to fall, and the capacity to recruit Asian 
construction and service workers contracts, the impact is felt very keenly in 
the Philippines and Indonesia. By the same token the agents, financiers and 
shippers spawned by the labour trade can be easily adapted to smuggling 
arms or refugees. Thus a global interconnectedness, the product of the 
globalisation of the powerless, brings both awareness of the source of 
human frustration and one means to address it. 
Disabled States 
States are the organisations that carve up and claim both ownership and 
human identification with the world's resources. States create boundaries 
and enforce order on their subjects and repel, invade or negotiate with 
other states. The essence of states is coercion and consent to control 
the people in a well-defined territory and the capacity to wage war on 
competitor states. But as the historian Eric Hobsbawn recently argued, 
there are only about two dozen or so really effective modern states. Those 
states are able to guarantee something of a social contract that is meant 
to replace the subject of the coercive state with the consensual citizen of 
the modern liberal polity. 
States in which the regular functioning of a democratic polity is the 
norm are relatively rare and probably decreasing. Although many states 
maintain a quasi-democratic veneer-that is they hold elections-the 
serious democratic state with periodic changes of government and 
competing political parties is atypical. Even when this occurs the use of 
repressive laws, controlled media, bribery, secret police and other forms 
of intimidation may significantly undermine the efficacy of democratic 
institutions. 
But the capacity of states to pursue their democratic ideals of citizenship 
is limited by their capacity to resist actual and potential invasion, attack 
and internal manipulation from without. In reality few states are able 
to maintain anything like real sovereignty. Weak states often lack both 
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internal legitimacy and effective protection from outside interference. 
The weakening of the authority of the United Nations and the American 
doctrine of military pre-emptive strikes have simply underlined the sense 
of impotence of weak states. From a strictly military point of view there 
is currently only one serious modern state with its global alliance system. 
In other words, the globalised economy (a single capitalist commodity 
and financial market) has produced a roughly parallel global state system. 
And that global state system-organised from the one remaining super-
power-is the dominant means to impose the conditions for globalisation 
on the world of the expanding periphery. 
In this unique situation of overwhelming United States economic and 
military power, the temptation to threaten and intimidate other states is 
apparently irresistible. Furthermore, the idea of identifying 'rogue states' 
that invite external aggression has been normalised. And between the 
few strong states and the handful of rogue states lie dozens of actual and 
potential weak states, unable to resist internal and external sub~e:sion. 
Neo-liberal policy requirements imposed on weak states as a condItIOn of 
access to international trade and capital borrowing by the World Trade 
Organisation, The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
weaken the internal legitimacy of many states. Forcing Indonesia to remove 
price controls on rice, kerosene and other necessities, or forcing the Papua 
New Guinea government to reduce public services and reduce the size of 
the publicly-funded workforce are sure-fire ways to undermine an already 
shaky state legitimacy. 
Thus the reverse side of the coalescence of the remaining powerful 
states into a global economic and military alliance led by the United 
States is the process of disabling many of the remaining states. Disabled 
states might be defined as those that have lost (or perhaps never had) the 
capacity to employ both consent and coercion to reshape social relations 
within their territory (and resist those from outside who seek to engineer 
internal social change). We might understand this process as the forced 
undermining of the already limited means to generate consent from the 
governed. Weak states are subject to the requirements of the neo-libe:al 
reform agenda. This agenda is generally imposed in weak states by agencIes 
of international trade and finance. The International Monetary Fund, The 
World Bank and the World Trade Organisation all press for reforms that 
reconstruct public finances, the role of government in the economy and 
the provision of government subsidies and services. .... 
The hallmarks of the neo-liberal agenda include: the extenSIve pnvatIs-
ation of public enterprises and public services; the removal of government 
subsidies on food and a range of necessities; the ending or significant 
reduction of protection or subsidies to national industry and the opening 
of economies to international competition; the freeing of the financial 
sector from rigid state control and the recognition that financial regulation 
should be beyond political interference; changes to taxation regimes both 
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to reduce the taxation burden on investors and the wealthy and to increase 
taxes on consumption; and the revaluation of currencies in line with global 
market expectations. Encouraging large foreign corporations to invest or 
take over existing industries, removing financial controls in the rush to 
deregulation, and the increasing protection of the intellectual property 
rights of the rich similarly fall into this category. 
There is scant evidence that these moves to liberalise economies have 
beneficial effects. Rich and well-organised economies like those of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan can adapt to change, but weak and vulnerable 
economies liked those in the Philippines or Indonesia are further 
impoverished, or the economic well-being of the bulk of their people is 
further impoverished. In the growing cities, and especially the shanty 
towns of the region, the state provides nothing and guarantees little. And 
somewhat paradoxically, foisting the superficial machinery of a democratic 
state onto an incoherent political and economic entity is likely to expedite 
the process of disabling an already weakened state. 
Disabled states are then unable to resist impositions by powerful 
external states. They have to endure demands to cede territory or airspace 
to accept military, policing or intelligence occupation by foreign powers. 
They cannot resist or effectively respond to demands to change their 
legal culture, and overturn their legislation and judicial determinations. 
Hopelessly indebted, they lack the means to plan or coordinate economic 
and social transformations. They are literally mortgaged to international 
private interests and powerful global agencies and dominant states. 
Overwhelmed by global media and cultural forces, the moral authority 
of the state and its basis in historical circumstances and tradition are 
undermined. And in the process, the idea that the state as the one coherent 
organisation that has the potential to facilitate subjects becoming citizens 
is lost. At this point we are told the problem is governance-as if it were a 
sort of technique-rather than the capacity of government to substantially 
intervene in the allocation of wealth, income, and resources. 
The entire political project of the reconstruction of state and civil 
society that stretches from Hegel to modern liberalism (via the modernising 
project that liberalism and socialism once shared) is thereby.undermined, 
fatally weakened and hastily dismantled. The real historical potential to 
create modern democratic states, and to recognise the long and complex 
process of social change that builds a democratic polity, is thereby fatally 
compromised by simplistic ideas about 'regime change' and democratic 
'capacity building'. Again we can only point out the irony that the only 
states in our region that may emerge as modern functioning liberal 
democracies have achieved that result with repressive states ignoring the 
strictures of openness that market capitalism now seems to demand. 
Weakened states provide fertile soil for ideologies, organisations and 
beliefs that focus on the hypocrisy of Western notions of modernity. The 
impact of market reforms, international trade and foreign investment 
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without a state capable of regulation and welfare breaks bonds of solidarity 
and community concern, without providing any serious substitute. 
Indeed we are witnessing the whirlwind of market relations without a 
capitalism of sustained accumulation. A theoretical confusion at the 
heart of the modernisation movement fails to understand that capitalist 
modernisation-the formulation of a disciplined and educated workforce, 
the sustained investment in modern means of production, the movement 
of investment and workers to the most profitable and rapidly growing 
sectors of the economy, the formation of an economically organised and 
politically conscious leadership group-does not automatically result from 
the buying and selling of natural resources and labour. We shall return 
to this issue below. 
It follows that the disabled states of Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua 
New Guinea and countless other countries are increasingly unable to 
generate the conditions for forging consent from the governed and for 
developing an expanding civil society. A self-conscious and dominant 
economic class-a group that is attempting to build a national economy-is 
unable to form in these circumstances. In their stead we see 'rent seekers' 
and corrupt deal makers flourish. Wealth is generated by connection and 
corruption rather than from those who organise the activities of wealth 
creation. The dominant political classes (who generally overlap with the 
economic elites) are thereby unable to lay the foundations of a national 
economy and of a seriously democratic polity. Instead the centralised 
state tends to break into regional fiefdoms, local militias masquerading as 
armies of the state, private institutions providing rudimentary education 
and health and with it the dangerous assertion of identity politics. The 
disabling of the postcolonial state brings in its wake the potential violence 
implicit in the new arenas of community and identity politics. 
Identity and Ethnicity 
Running parallel, but not to be confused with the rise of market capitalism, 
were the theory and practice of the universal and all-encompassing state. 
This idea associated with the Enlightenment provided the universal claims 
of citizenship, science and human rights. These universal claims were 
somewhat paradoxically to be enforced and expanded within the province 
of national states. The idea was that the civilising mission of the state is to 
create, force, educate, and inculcate the principles of identification with the 
state irrespective of ethnicity, religion or social class. Primordial loyalties 
based on location, occupation, language, social custom or traditions were 
to be replaced by loyalty to the nation and its state. The modern state had 
to concern itself with the destruction of specific loyalties-to family, place, 
kith and kin-and substitute them with universal loyalties to extensive 
territory and abstract ideas. 
Any number of programs had to be devised to enforce uniform language 
acquisition and expression-vocabulary and grammar were subject to 
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rationalisation and clarification. National conscript armies, compulsory 
state education, forced relocation of ethnic minorities, religious persecution 
and military occupation were all employed as the necessary tools to create 
the modern state. Ethnic and religious minorities were brought to heel and 
forced to sublimate their beliefs under the national state. In this process the 
modern state eliminated or repressed the most threatening manifestations 
of what we would now call identity politics in order to create the conditions 
for the liberal democratic state. The central plank of this state was the 
universal rights of all citizens as political actors and legal subjects and the 
separation of the state from religious and anti-scientific prejudice. 
Once established via a process of coercion and buttressed by a rapidly 
expanding economy the modern state could afford to encourage both 
a growing form of consensus and eventually a reluctant acceptance of 
residual forms of cultural difference. Indeed the most recently evolved 
forms of the liberal state, which were largely constituted by immigrants 
already socialised to accept the demands of the liberal democratic state, 
could even embrace the politics of significant cultural diversity. Thus the 
homogenising process slowly gave way to what recently has been termed 
multiculturalism. Moreover the coercive phase of creating the 'universal 
citizen' has eased off and come to an end, faced with the need to create a 
suitable level of consensus amongst the population. The complex dialectic 
of developed capitalism and liberal democracy could then begin to look 
natural and inevitable. 
But in the colonial states the process was quite different, and that 
difference gave the lie to a simple equation between the market and the 
ballot box. The colonial state was not so much an exercise in forging citizens 
for the modern secular state, as in coercing a part of the working population 
to be integrated into market relations, but without addressing diverse 
cultural and religious differences. Thus it pressed for the market without the 
ballot box. Indeed with the possible exception of the French in Indochina 
-who half believed in imposing French notions of citizenship-local 
government and education, the colonial powers encouraged, even created, 
ethnic complexity, religious observance and non-scientific ideologies as 
a means by which to divide and rule. Imperial concerns were not with 
national building, nor economic transformations. Colonisers had shorter-
term and immediate interests in exploiting the raw materials, the potential 
workforce, and the unique products of specific territory. To maximise 
opportunities and maintain control-often when vastly outnumbered 
by 'natives', a range of solutions was used. The post-colonial legacy has 
been mass migration, ethnic complexities and the powerful imprint of 
what is politely called communalism or what we might call ethnic and 
religious differences and intolerance. Thus a great deal of what might be 
called identity politics in the postcolonial era is not so much the effects 
of traditions (though that undoubtedly played its part) but the impact of 
colonialism and the first phase of globalisation. 
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Deeply planted in much of this Zone of Instability is a sense of ethnic, 
religious and communal difference. Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
Chinese and Indian diasporas have deeply affected the region's ethnicity. 
Global religions-Islam, Buddhism and Christianity-have likewise left 
powerful cultural forces. But local and regional minorities with long-
standing grievances with the central states have not disappeared. The 
forces that assert difference and tradition are powerfully arrayed against 
the weakened and weakening modernist impulses. 
Migration and Identity 
We can now begin to see that the Zone of Instability, as I have defined 
it, is crisscrossed by three complex and contradictory global forces. First 
is the effect of globalisation. As the rich centres of the global economy 
continue to reel from declining profit rates, market collapses and the crisis 
of corporate governance, the implications for the globalised periphery are 
almost unimaginable. Poverty, unemployment and misery are endemic 
and show few signs of abating. Even by the dubious measure of the very 
agencies that are trying to engineer the neo-liberal world order, there are 
few signs that positive economic growth is occurring. Where some growth 
is evident, there are no signs that the growth is beneficial to the majority. 
The Chinese economy, by no stretch of the imagination a product of neo-
liberalism, stands out as the major exception. 
Second, the disabled states that are unable to create conditions for 
a social consensus and democratic citizenship are growing in number. 
Perhaps half the 200 or so currently existing states are either 'failed states' 
or close to failure. Few in our region have attracted foreign or international 
intervention and peace keeping forces-though East Timor and Cambodia 
have been externally administered and the Solomon Islands and Papua New 
Guinea are experiencing very strong Australian intervention. Significant 
independence movements are evident in parts of Indonesia-West Irian, 
Aceh, Kalimantan, the Moluccas and elsewhere. The Philippines has 
similarly a long-running political and ethnic war. North Korea appears 
incapable of feeding its own population and is subject to the threat of 
both military and economic warfare. 
The enduring legacy of communal attachments provides a powerful 
resource that can be readily exploited by opportunist intellectuals and 
ideologues to assist their rise to power. Into the void left by failed or 
failing states step the forces of localised militarism, gangsterism, religious 
fundamentalism and regional separatism. Few of the separatists or 
independence movements are equipped with programs, institutions, 
ideologies or leaderships that bring confidence that a new inclusive state is 
under construction. On the contrary, lapsing into localism and regionalism 
generates little real confidence in future prospects. This is so not only in 
countries within our region but in those countries in south and central Asia 
and the Middle East which migrate their problems into the region. 
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We can now begin to discern the causes of the rapid growth in 
indentured migrant labour, prostitution as an organised national industry 
and remittence workers as a leading part of the export economy. We 
can also perceive why postmodern theories nominate identity politics 
and the abandonment of the Enlightenment project as characteristic of 
disabled states. Freed from the constraints imposed by the multicultural 
liberal states, fashionable ideologies-such as postmodernism-with their 
emphasis on difference, experience, subjectivity and the local, feed the 
powerful appetites of the politics of exclusion and localism. By abandoning 
the universal claims of the Enlightenment all grounds for defending human 
rights (merely a Western and thus imperialist imposition) are lost. In such 
a context we can only envisage that current conditions in the former Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, and in Afghanistan, illustrate the future of much 
of the Zone of Instability. 
The northern states of Asia have provided not just the region but the 
world with one of the very few examples of successful social transformation. 
They are fully integrated into the modern commodity economy and their 
stability crucially depends on the global capitalist economy. Despite signs 
of long-running stagnation in Japan and a difficult readjustment by Taiwan 
and South Korea to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, economic growth has 
returned. These states show few signs of democratic collapse, disintegration 
or ethnic conflict. China, the latest example of the developmental state, 
is perhaps the most volatile, and potentially dangerous. As the levels of 
internal migrations, rapid industrialisation, dramatic urbanisation and 
transformations to work, education and communication attest, this is the 
largest experiment in economic and social modernisation yet attempted. 
This process of modernisation is increasingly linked to the demand for 
industrial exports to the United States. Thus a certain level of instability 
is built directly into the modernisation project. 
Closer to home the situation looks a lot more problematic. There is no 
clear evidence that the spread of either economic growth or democratisation 
is likely to succeed. Rather the economies of Thailand and Malaysia-the 
nearest to local adaptations of the developmental state-are losing 
their momentum. More seriously, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, 
the Philippines, Cambodia and a host of island states show no sign of 
arresting their slide to the status of failed states. Equally worrying, the 
long-standing circuits of labour migration within and beyond the region, 
and the associated organisations to recruit, ship, discipline and disseminate 
workers, have created the networks and machinery to assist migratory 
workers and refugees. These networks are easily adapted to spread ideology, 
and move organisers, weapons and money. In short our regional zone of 
instability is increasingly integrated into the globalisation of instability. 
It seems highly unlikely that both the circumstances facing tens if not 
hundreds of millions of people in our region and their links with hundreds 
of millions outside the region point to a bleak reality for those who advocate 
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the hard line on refugees and fail to understand the underlying causes of 
global population movements. 
An Australian Response 
Coming from a nation of immigrants, the Australian response to refugees 
is confusing. As a nation so willing in the past to accept large numbers 
of refugees from Vietnam, Lebanon, Chile and other places of human 
rights violations, Australia in the recent past is all the more perplexing. 
Establishing detention centres, changing national boundaries, using the 
navy so ruthlessly and disregarding international refugee agreements 
- seem both shortsighted and inexplicable. But viewed within the logic of 
globalisation the response is at least understandable if not defensible. 
Having disposed of both communism and socialism (modernising secular 
state-building ideologies) and encouraged the disabling of postcolonial 
states, the beneficiaries of globalisation are now organising to stop the 
lifeboats from the world's dispossessed. 
Moreover they are militantly unwilling in the name of the globalising 
project to inject foreign aid, or encourage the spread of global labour 
standards or champion the global rule of law. Instead the military and 
coercive response increases as the global patterns of inequality grow. 
Populist campaigns to defend Australian territory and wealth from a 
potential influx of refugees simply add to an unrestrained tally of national 
'bad faith'. Signing up for a global war on terrorism is easily translated 
from the periphery as a justification of a war of the rich on the poor. And 
in turn this fosters the climate of social intolerance that threatens the 
liberal state with both populist rhetoric from within and terrorist attack 
from without. 
An attempt to turn around this frightening and predictable spiral of 
global and regional violence and intolerance looks increasingly unlikel'y-:-
yet in a sense the refugee crisis is but one aspect of a deeper global cnSIS. 
Globalisation with its inexorable transformation of global economic and 
political balances threatens to completely derail the liberal democratic 
(and we might add multicultural) project. Without a complex rethinking 
of global economic, political and human rights priorities-an embrace of 
a global social economy-little is likely to improve. And befo:e lon~ ~he 
Canute-like policies of the Australian Government and both major polItICal 
parties and much of the population will be seen for what they are: a feeble 
and self-serving attempt to ignore the dangerous consequences of rampant 
globalisation. Australia's proximity to a regional zone of instability will 
simply highlight the impact of these dangers . 
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